In the backdrop of the U.S. National Security Strategy prioritizing the Western Hemisphere, American military action in Venezuela, U.S. President Donald Trump’s efforts at rapprochement with China and Russia, and the administration’s inconsistent relationships with treaty allies and partners in Europe and Indo-Pacific, there is intensified speculation about whether the world is heading towards a great power-led, spheres-of-influence-centric order.
TAG’s experts, who have been at the forefront of policymaking in the United States and Indo-Pacific, weigh in:
Ashok Malik: There’s no evidence Trump is promoting spheres of influence. And the power dynamic in Europe and Asia is different from the Americas.
While promoting United States’ supremacy in the Americas, there is no evidence that Donald Trump has acceded to the principle of spheres of influence for other major powers or even for China. To concede a sphere of influence in Asia or the Indo-Pacific to China, and in Eurasia to Russia, would be to walk away from the economies of those mega-regions in at least some measure. Also, at a practical level, the power — and military capability — differential between the United States and other countries in the Americas is far greater than that between China and the middle powers of the Indo-Pacific or between a weakening Russian economy and its European neighbors. Acceptance or maintenance of a sphere of influence is decidedly more difficult in those geographies.
Businesses are not moralists. Those corporations and national economies that have a disproportionate dependence on American technology, capital, and market access are attempting to adjust to the Trump normal. The problem here is not an unwillingness to make concessions — whether in tariff cuts or investments in U.S.-based manufacturing — but that the Trump normal is dynamic, unpredictable, even mercurial. A non-American sphere of influence will need to be both capable of being imposed (top-down) and demand driven (bottom-up). The demand can come only when an alternative regional hegemon fulfills all the economic, technological, and, to a degree, security options provided by the United States. Despite the turbulence of Trumpism, the world is not there yet.
Kurt Tong: It is not so simple. Strong, connected nations in Asia and Europe cannot be bullied.
Russia and China would no doubt like to interpret President Trump’s new Monroe Doctrine–style “sphere of influence” rhetoric (and actions) around Venezuela and Greenland as giving them carte blanche to take a similar approach in their own “backyards.” But I think they probably understand it is not so simple.
First, U.S. attention to the Western Hemisphere does not necessarily mean retrenchment elsewhere. U.S. allies and partners in Europe and Asia will work hard to keep the United States engaged. More important, those allies and partners have their own resources and determination to resist aggrandizement. Russia’s failures in Ukraine and the strengthening defense postures of NATO and Japan are key exhibits of resolve.
In the end, nations that are weak and isolated can be bullied; those that are strong and connected will not.
Mira Rapp-Hooper: Yes, by default. The costs of the might-makes-right approach will be grave.
While foreign policy critics were quick to refer to President Trump’s foreign policy as a spheres-of-influence approach when he was re-inaugurated last year, I have long thought that characterization too blunt and believed that Trump lacked the strategic intent and consistency to advance such a strategy. In the wake of the release of the National Security Strategy and the capture of Nicolas Maduro, however, I believe I was wrong — the Trump administration is pursuing a spheres-of-influence approach, albeit by default. The lack of clarity around these emerging arrangements may invite uncertainty and miscalculation.
By elevating the Western Hemisphere and insisting that the United States will have its way in its neighborhood, including through the use of force when it is in violation of international law, Washington is asserting a might-makes-right prerogative that recalls the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Since Maduro’s capture, senior administration officials have suggested that Greenland and Cuba may be subsequent targets. And while the administration has not withdrawn troops or cut ties with allies in Europe or Asia, formally ceding these spheres to Russia and China, respectively, its desire to cut deals with both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping increasingly lead those allies to question where U.S. alignments lie and whether Washington will maintain its security commitments in those regions. The Trump administration has been quite clear that it would prefer Europe to go it alone without the United States, while it has not been nearly so blunt to partners in Asia. Nevertheless, if Trump appears to enter into a rapprochement with Xi when he visits Beijing in April, the same effect may well be achieved.
The spheres-of-influence world of the 19th and early 20th century had a high propensity for conflict. A return to such an approach makes it more likely that states will resort to force and the use of coercion to settle disputes, eschewing the norms, rules, and institutions that helped to keep the world relatively peaceful after 1945. For now, the biggest danger may be that the world — including erstwhile adversaries, such as China and Russia — do not know where the United States is committed and what interests it intends to maintain. If, for example, Xi is no longer persuaded that the United States intends to support Taiwan’s defense, he may test the proposition in ways that are deeply destabilizing to Asia and to the global economy.
The so-called international order that emerged after the Second World War was not born of nostalgia — it was an effort to end the economic cataclysm and tragic loss of life that had decimated the world in the decades prior. Spheres of influence, whether intentional or by default, will come at grave costs, although they may take months or years to begin to accrue.
Nisha Biswal: Yes, but Trump’s preference will collide with middle powers and markets.
Donald Trump’s foreign policy signals a preference for a world order in which major powers assert dominance within defined spheres of influence — a model reminiscent of 19th century geopolitics. While this approach may find resonance with leaders such as Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, its durability faces significant constraints.
Middle powers and emerging economies such as the European Union, India, Japan, and Mexico, are unlikely to acquiesce quietly. These actors have vested interests in preserving a rules-based international system that safeguards their autonomy and economic leverage.
Moreover, the deep interdependence of global markets complicates any rigid segmentation of influence. U.S. businesses, particularly in technology, manufacturing, and services, rely heavily on Asian and European markets for growth and innovation. Attempts to compartmentalize trade and investment along geopolitical lines would disrupt supply chains, raise costs, and erode competitiveness.
For Asia, this could mean heightened uncertainty. Companies may need to navigate competing regulatory regimes, shifting alliances, and potential trade barriers. However, it also creates opportunities for regional players to assert leadership in multilateral frameworks and diversify partnerships.
In short, while Trump’s approach may accelerate great-power jockeying, structural realities — economic globalization and the agency of middle powers — make a fully sphere-of-influence-centric world improbable. Businesses in Asia should prepare for volatility but also leverage their strategic position to shape a more inclusive economic order.
Nirav Patel: We don’t know. But U.S. foreign policy is now linked to the administration’s narrative on homeland security.
Simply put, we do not know. There are clear indications that U.S. foreign policy interests and pursuits directly correlate with homeland security. In the Trump administration’s narrative, many Latin American countries enable the distribution of narcotics, which kill tens of thousands of Americans, create societal issues, and impact local communities. The administration’s political narrative also links crime and homelessness with the same set of factors. Therefore, a focus on Latin America could be connected to a clearer articulation of U.S. international interests — born out of the administration’s stated national priorities — rather than driven by dividing the world into spheres of influence.
For Asia, the lessons are less clear. The president emphasizes reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers. But aside from China’s role in fentanyl trafficking, the administration has not addressed Asia’s role in the drug epidemic in the United States. Some U.S. military actions in Latin America could impact how Asian countries view potential partnerships with the United States.
For now, the administration’s Asia approach seems to be about compelling changes in trade relationships to encourage domestic job creation in the United States. With the upcoming visit of the Japanese prime minister to the United States, and then President Trump’s visit to China, we will have more clarity on how year two of the Trump presidency evolves on Asia policy.
Kelly Magsamen: It is a new era, but the United States is unlikely to abandon its interests in the Indo-Pacific.
We are certainly moving past the “rules-based international order” as we knew it, but that order has been weakening for at least a few decades. What replaces it is less certain and will manifest over time with significant geopolitical volatility in the interim. We may see more “spheres-of-influence” behavior by great powers as a result of Trump’s foreign policy, but countries such as China and Russia have been behaving like that for years now on the basis of their own perceived interests (see the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Chinese expansionism in the South China and East China Seas). So, I would caution against over-indexing on the impact of the Venezuela operation on China’s decision-making on Taiwan. That said, if the Trump administration extends its newfound enthusiasm for military adventures to Greenland, Colombia, Iran, Panama, or Mexico, the tectonic plates of the global order could shift much faster.
The Trump administration, however, is unlikely to abandon its interests in the Indo-Pacific or defer to Chinese interests entirely — limiting a “spheres-of-influence” dynamic. It may, however, adjust emphasis on which interests may be more or less important. The next Trump-Xi meeting will be an important watchpoint. Based on the experience of the past year and the Trump administration’s own National Security Strategy, it views U.S. interests in the region as primarily economic (and nakedly mercantilist), with far less emphasis on security, which has underpinned U.S. policy in the region for decades. This could open new commercial and investment opportunities for U.S. and Asian companies — albeit against the backdrop of significant geopolitical volatility that will require sophisticated and nimble strategy.
In the meantime, we are also seeing signs of strategic hedging behavior globally through European and Asian defense spending increases, defense procurement diversification, and the pursuit of diplomatic initiatives without the United States at the table. This dynamic also opens up opportunities for Indo-Pacific–European collaboration, especially in the defense and technology sectors.
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Commentary
Expert Corner: Is Donald Trump Heralding a Great Power-led, Sphere-of-Influence-Centric World Order? What Does It Mean for Businesses and Asia?
In the backdrop of the U.S. National Security Strategy prioritizing the Western Hemisphere, American military action in Venezuela, U.S. President Donald Trump’s efforts at rapprochement with China and Russia, and the administration’s inconsistent relationships with treaty allies and partners in Europe and Indo-Pacific, there is intensified speculation about whether the world is heading towards a great power-led, spheres-of-influence-centric order.
TAG’s experts, who have been at the forefront of policymaking in the United States and Indo-Pacific, weigh in:
While promoting United States’ supremacy in the Americas, there is no evidence that Donald Trump has acceded to the principle of spheres of influence for other major powers or even for China. To concede a sphere of influence in Asia or the Indo-Pacific to China, and in Eurasia to Russia, would be to walk away from the economies of those mega-regions in at least some measure. Also, at a practical level, the power — and military capability — differential between the United States and other countries in the Americas is far greater than that between China and the middle powers of the Indo-Pacific or between a weakening Russian economy and its European neighbors. Acceptance or maintenance of a sphere of influence is decidedly more difficult in those geographies.
Businesses are not moralists. Those corporations and national economies that have a disproportionate dependence on American technology, capital, and market access are attempting to adjust to the Trump normal. The problem here is not an unwillingness to make concessions — whether in tariff cuts or investments in U.S.-based manufacturing — but that the Trump normal is dynamic, unpredictable, even mercurial. A non-American sphere of influence will need to be both capable of being imposed (top-down) and demand driven (bottom-up). The demand can come only when an alternative regional hegemon fulfills all the economic, technological, and, to a degree, security options provided by the United States. Despite the turbulence of Trumpism, the world is not there yet.
Russia and China would no doubt like to interpret President Trump’s new Monroe Doctrine–style “sphere of influence” rhetoric (and actions) around Venezuela and Greenland as giving them carte blanche to take a similar approach in their own “backyards.” But I think they probably understand it is not so simple.
First, U.S. attention to the Western Hemisphere does not necessarily mean retrenchment elsewhere. U.S. allies and partners in Europe and Asia will work hard to keep the United States engaged. More important, those allies and partners have their own resources and determination to resist aggrandizement. Russia’s failures in Ukraine and the strengthening defense postures of NATO and Japan are key exhibits of resolve.
In the end, nations that are weak and isolated can be bullied; those that are strong and connected will not.
While foreign policy critics were quick to refer to President Trump’s foreign policy as a spheres-of-influence approach when he was re-inaugurated last year, I have long thought that characterization too blunt and believed that Trump lacked the strategic intent and consistency to advance such a strategy. In the wake of the release of the National Security Strategy and the capture of Nicolas Maduro, however, I believe I was wrong — the Trump administration is pursuing a spheres-of-influence approach, albeit by default. The lack of clarity around these emerging arrangements may invite uncertainty and miscalculation.
By elevating the Western Hemisphere and insisting that the United States will have its way in its neighborhood, including through the use of force when it is in violation of international law, Washington is asserting a might-makes-right prerogative that recalls the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Since Maduro’s capture, senior administration officials have suggested that Greenland and Cuba may be subsequent targets. And while the administration has not withdrawn troops or cut ties with allies in Europe or Asia, formally ceding these spheres to Russia and China, respectively, its desire to cut deals with both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping increasingly lead those allies to question where U.S. alignments lie and whether Washington will maintain its security commitments in those regions. The Trump administration has been quite clear that it would prefer Europe to go it alone without the United States, while it has not been nearly so blunt to partners in Asia. Nevertheless, if Trump appears to enter into a rapprochement with Xi when he visits Beijing in April, the same effect may well be achieved.
The spheres-of-influence world of the 19th and early 20th century had a high propensity for conflict. A return to such an approach makes it more likely that states will resort to force and the use of coercion to settle disputes, eschewing the norms, rules, and institutions that helped to keep the world relatively peaceful after 1945. For now, the biggest danger may be that the world — including erstwhile adversaries, such as China and Russia — do not know where the United States is committed and what interests it intends to maintain. If, for example, Xi is no longer persuaded that the United States intends to support Taiwan’s defense, he may test the proposition in ways that are deeply destabilizing to Asia and to the global economy.
The so-called international order that emerged after the Second World War was not born of nostalgia — it was an effort to end the economic cataclysm and tragic loss of life that had decimated the world in the decades prior. Spheres of influence, whether intentional or by default, will come at grave costs, although they may take months or years to begin to accrue.
Donald Trump’s foreign policy signals a preference for a world order in which major powers assert dominance within defined spheres of influence — a model reminiscent of 19th century geopolitics. While this approach may find resonance with leaders such as Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, its durability faces significant constraints.
Middle powers and emerging economies such as the European Union, India, Japan, and Mexico, are unlikely to acquiesce quietly. These actors have vested interests in preserving a rules-based international system that safeguards their autonomy and economic leverage.
Moreover, the deep interdependence of global markets complicates any rigid segmentation of influence. U.S. businesses, particularly in technology, manufacturing, and services, rely heavily on Asian and European markets for growth and innovation. Attempts to compartmentalize trade and investment along geopolitical lines would disrupt supply chains, raise costs, and erode competitiveness.
For Asia, this could mean heightened uncertainty. Companies may need to navigate competing regulatory regimes, shifting alliances, and potential trade barriers. However, it also creates opportunities for regional players to assert leadership in multilateral frameworks and diversify partnerships.
In short, while Trump’s approach may accelerate great-power jockeying, structural realities — economic globalization and the agency of middle powers — make a fully sphere-of-influence-centric world improbable. Businesses in Asia should prepare for volatility but also leverage their strategic position to shape a more inclusive economic order.
Simply put, we do not know. There are clear indications that U.S. foreign policy interests and pursuits directly correlate with homeland security. In the Trump administration’s narrative, many Latin American countries enable the distribution of narcotics, which kill tens of thousands of Americans, create societal issues, and impact local communities. The administration’s political narrative also links crime and homelessness with the same set of factors. Therefore, a focus on Latin America could be connected to a clearer articulation of U.S. international interests — born out of the administration’s stated national priorities — rather than driven by dividing the world into spheres of influence.
For Asia, the lessons are less clear. The president emphasizes reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers. But aside from China’s role in fentanyl trafficking, the administration has not addressed Asia’s role in the drug epidemic in the United States. Some U.S. military actions in Latin America could impact how Asian countries view potential partnerships with the United States.
For now, the administration’s Asia approach seems to be about compelling changes in trade relationships to encourage domestic job creation in the United States. With the upcoming visit of the Japanese prime minister to the United States, and then President Trump’s visit to China, we will have more clarity on how year two of the Trump presidency evolves on Asia policy.
We are certainly moving past the “rules-based international order” as we knew it, but that order has been weakening for at least a few decades. What replaces it is less certain and will manifest over time with significant geopolitical volatility in the interim. We may see more “spheres-of-influence” behavior by great powers as a result of Trump’s foreign policy, but countries such as China and Russia have been behaving like that for years now on the basis of their own perceived interests (see the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Chinese expansionism in the South China and East China Seas). So, I would caution against over-indexing on the impact of the Venezuela operation on China’s decision-making on Taiwan. That said, if the Trump administration extends its newfound enthusiasm for military adventures to Greenland, Colombia, Iran, Panama, or Mexico, the tectonic plates of the global order could shift much faster.
The Trump administration, however, is unlikely to abandon its interests in the Indo-Pacific or defer to Chinese interests entirely — limiting a “spheres-of-influence” dynamic. It may, however, adjust emphasis on which interests may be more or less important. The next Trump-Xi meeting will be an important watchpoint. Based on the experience of the past year and the Trump administration’s own National Security Strategy, it views U.S. interests in the region as primarily economic (and nakedly mercantilist), with far less emphasis on security, which has underpinned U.S. policy in the region for decades. This could open new commercial and investment opportunities for U.S. and Asian companies — albeit against the backdrop of significant geopolitical volatility that will require sophisticated and nimble strategy.
In the meantime, we are also seeing signs of strategic hedging behavior globally through European and Asian defense spending increases, defense procurement diversification, and the pursuit of diplomatic initiatives without the United States at the table. This dynamic also opens up opportunities for Indo-Pacific–European collaboration, especially in the defense and technology sectors.
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