The 119th Congress and China: Widespread Interest but Doubtful Legislative Outcomes
China, United States, Congress
Key Takeaways
Much Talk, Less Action: Bipartisan interest in China on Capitol Hill is wide but not deep. In 2024, Congress held nearly 40 China-focused hearings – a slight drop from 50 in 2023 – and debated over 800 China-related resolutions, bills, and amendments. But aside from a piece of nearly unanimous legislation to force ByteDance to divest TikTok – now suspended by President Donald Trump – no significant bills impacting China or U.S.-China relations were signed into law.
Trump in Charge: The Republican-controlled Congress in 2025 will look to President Trump to drive the legislative agenda. China policy issues that previously enjoyed bipartisan support (i.e., outbound investment screening, export controls, biotechnology restrictions) will be placed on the back burner until the new administration reviews Biden-era executive orders and sets its policy directions – unless specific events prompt bipartisan legislation to snowball into law.
More Partisanship: As the 119th Congress reacts to President Trump’s swift and aggressive policymaking style, previous bipartisan amity on China issues may fray. Democrats seem likely to resist the President’s agenda by picking at the details of issues like tariffs, the mooted revocation of normal trade relations, and other China competition issues, setting political limits on legislative activity until the midterm elections in 2026 – against the backdrop of very narrow Republican majorities in both Congressional chambers.
Lots of Small Issues and One Big One: Much of the legislative agenda carried over from 2024 – blocking certain Chinese biopharmaceutical companies, codifying investment restrictions, or closing the de minimis loophole – would create sector-specific problems, and hurt certain classes of corporations. But they would not lead to deep changes in U.S.-China ties or U.S. economic competitiveness. The main exception to this is the idea of permanently revoking China’s status as a normal trading partner, which would be a structural and historic change. For that reason, President Trump is likely to retain control over that lever for use in his own China strategy.
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The 119th Congress and China: Widespread Interest but Doubtful Legislative Outcomes
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