Commentary

 While Donald Trump and Joe Biden’s first term approaches to trade with Japan showed many similarities, their approaches to security cooperation differed significantly. Trump urged Japan to strengthen its defense capabilities without further committing U.S. resources and grumbled about the expense of U.S. support to Japan’s defense. 

Throughout their first terms in office, both Trump and Biden pursued dramatic policies aimed at curbing strategic competitors’ access to U.S. technology and capital. Rhetoric from both administrations underscored the critical role of export controls in preserving U.S. national security, technological superiority, and strategic sectors. 

 Both Trump and Biden in 2025 are comfortable with high tariffs and export controls aimed at competing with China, but Biden has pushed for industrial subsidies more than Trump has. Both leaders are viewed as “protectionist” by Indo-Pacific policy leaders. 

The high degree of Congressional attention on the challenges China poses to U.S. values and interests did not translate into new lawmaking last year. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer’s (D-NY) early plans to pull together a China Competition Bill 2.0 – the third such effort since the 2021 legislation that eventually resulted in passage of

Singapore made progress toward establishing region-wide digital standards at the meeting, but implementation will likely be sporadic and vary by country. The ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics is a highly practical step – part policy document and part guidebook – emphasizing values and principles for governments and businesses rather than dictating binding measures.

Each trend poses risks and opportunities that will directly affect the operating environment for multinational corporations. Understanding the dynamics behind each issue and staying alert to key watchpoints will be crucial to navigate the shifting regional business environment. 

Energy prices have remained largely stable since Hamas’s October 7 attacks. But regionalization of the conflict or non-military retaliation by Arab governments would likely drive up prices.

China‘s initial posture following Hamas’ surprise terrorist attack in Israel on October 7 reflected a familiar strategy of minimizing risk by avoiding involvement and any sharp public statements. Notably, China has not specifically condemned Hamas’ October 7 actions, but has condemned violence against civilians and called for restraint by “all parties.”  

The CAC, which was founded in 2011 as the country’s internet regulator and enforcer, is not a typical administrative agency in the executive branch of the government. Instead, the CAC is a party-state entity, closely intertwined with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and thus holds more power than most ministries under the leadership of Premier

Beijing seeks to promote the BRF as an event on par with other high profile multilateral engagements – and China as the leader of the Global South. Media rreporrtts, however, suggest that fewer high-level Western officials will attend the 2023 BRF than in years past.